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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. section 78-2a-3 (2)(k) (Supp. 1994). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues presented for review are whether the legal 
conclusions of the trial court are correct as to the following: 
1. Whether Defendants are liable for conversion of the D-7 
Caterpillar and sheepsfoot. 
2. Whether punitive damages should be awarded against 
Defendants. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Review of a trial court's conclusions of law are based on a 
correction of error standard, granting no deference to the trial 
court. Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677, 680 (Utah App. 
1989), aff'd, 788 P.2d 520 (Utah 1990), Lake Philaas v. Valley 
Bank and Trust Company, 845 P.2d 951 (Utah App. 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Attached in Appendix 1 is Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-
56. 
Attached in Appendix 2 is Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is an action for the 
conversion of a Caterpillar Bulldozer, and of a sheepsfoot which 
is an implement used in conjunction with the Caterpillar. 
B. Proceedings Below. 
A complaint naming Romona Smith and Fred Smith as Plaintiffs 
and Doug Shelly and Domonic Bonino as Defendants was filed on 
January 8, 1992, 
A complaint naming Romona Smith, Fred Smith, Max Smith, and 
Red Z, Inc. as Plaintiffs and Doug Shelly and Domonic Bonino as 
Defendants was filed on November 23# 1992. 
In August, 1993, the court ordered consolidation of the 
cases. 
The trial was held in front of Judge David L. Mower on 
August 26, 27, 30, September 8 and 9, 1993. 
The trial court found in favor of Plaintiffs and issued a 
Decision (including Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and an 
Order). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts in this matter are undisputed since: "The 
defendants do not contest the Findings of Fact entered by the 
trial court as part of it's memorandum decision." Brief of 
Appellants page 21. The following statement of facts is 
therefore taken verbatim from the Findings of Fact of the trial 
court: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Section A. The parties, witnesses and other 
individuals and entities. 
1. All the parties to this action are individuals, except 
Red Z, Ins, which is a corporation.(This finding was part of the 
parties' stipulation.) 
2. Plaintiff Romona Smith is the mother of plaintiffs J. 
Fred Smith and Max L. Smith. 
3. Plaintiffs Romona Smith and Max L. Smith live at the 
same residence at 485 West 120 North, Orem, Utah. 
4. Plaintiff J. Fred Smith is president of Red Z, Inc. He 
is also a director and an owner of 50% of the stock. 
5. A business known as Red Z was operated by Plaintiff J. 
Fred Smith until it was incorporated as Red Z, Inc. sometime 
after 1982. 
6. Plaintiff Max L. Smith was and is the defendant in a 
divorce action in this Curt, case number 9726. A decree of 
divorce was entered in that case on September 30, 1990. 
Paragraph 25 of that decree reads as follows: 
The Defendant, Max L. Smith, is awarded the use and 
possession of the D7 Caterpillar (sic) subject to all 
liability thereon and holding the Plaintiff harmless 
therefrom. The Plaintiff is reserved the right to use 
said machinery upon twenty-four (24) hours notice to 
the Defendant. The Plaintiff shall provide her own 
fuel. 
7. Deena C. Smith was and is the Plaintiff in case number 
9726, the divorce action. 
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8. Defendants are residents of Sanpete County, Utah. 
(This finding was part of the parties' stipulation.) 
9. Defendant Domonic Bonino operates a business under the 
name of Mountainville Enterprises. 
10. Defendant Doug Shelley operates an excavation business. 
He owns property at a place called Sports Haven, which is between 
Fairview and Mt. Pleasant in northern Sanpete County. 
11. Charles Cummins, Jr. is the president of Crystal 
Mountain Property Owners Association. 
12. David Hansen is assistant manager of Eureka Sales, a 
division of Wheeler Machinery Company of Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Eureka Sales is in the business of renting, selling and salvaging 
construction equipment and machinery. 
13. Larry Anderson is a sales representative of Utah Track 
and Welding, Inc. of Salt Lake City, Utah, which is the business 
of selling, and repairing construction equipment and machinery. 
14. Otho J. Walker is recently retired from operating a 
business known as Walker Construction Company. Among other 
things, it was in the business of construction equipment sales 
and repair. 
15. In 1991 Ross Blackham was the County Attorney of 
Sanpete County. 
Section B. Description of real and personal property items. 
16. The cause of action arose in Sanpete County, Utah. 
(This finding was part of the parties' stipulation.) 
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17. Over the last several years plaintiffs J. Fred Smith 
and Max L. Smith have been, separately, in the property 
development business. They have developed recreational 
subdivisions in northern Sanpete County, Utah. The development 
work has included road construction. 
18. In northern Sanpete County there is a parcel known as 
Crystal Mountain Subdivision. This property has also been known 
as the Indian Ridge Subdivision. There is also a parcel known as 
Oaker Hills Subdivision. 
19. The Crystal Mountain and Oaker Hills subdivisions are 
either contiguous or nearly so. 
20. There exists two pieces of construction equipment, a 
Model D-7 Caterpillar bulldozer, vehicle identification number 
4T9683, and a sheepsfoot. (This finding was part of the parties' 
stipulation.) 
21. The D-7 Caterpillar which is the subject of this case 
is the same one referred to in paragraph 25 of the decree of 
divorce in case number 9726. It is equipped with an in-line 4-
cylinder diesel engine which has two cylinder heads, each 
covering two cylinders. It is an older model, probably 
manufactured in 1954. 
22. A sheepsfoot (sometimes called a "tamper") is a road 
construction implement. It is a steel cylinder or drum about 4 
feet in diameter and about 6 feet in length, designed to be 
filled with water and then dragged behind a bulldozer for soil 
compaction. The outside surface of the drum is covered with 
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metal spikes between 8 and 12 inches in length. The combined 
action of the rolling of the drum and the inserting of the spikes 
provides soil compaction.1 
Section C. The events. 
23. The sheepsfoot was purchased by Plaintiff J. Fred Smith 
in 1982 and later transferred to Red Z, Inc. 
24. On October 14, 1988 Max L. Smith purchased the D-7 
Caterpillar from Walker Construction Company. (This finding was 
part of the parties' stipulation.) The purchase price, 
$5,250.00, was paid by a check signed by Max L. Smith and drawn 
on a bank account named "Oaker Hills." 
25. In 1989 both the D-7 and the sheepsfoot were on the 
Oaker Hills Subdivision property. 
26. In June or July of 1990 Mr. Max L. Smith drove the D-7 
Caterpillar from the Oaker Hills subdivision property toward the 
Crystal Mountain subdivision property. He never reached his 
destination (which was about 2 miles away) because there were 
holes in the D-7'S radiator. When the loss of the coolant caused 
the engine to begin overheating, Mr. Smith shut it down. 
27. A couple of days later Mr. Max L. Smith asked a friend 
with a motor grader to help move the D-7. This was done and the 
D-7 completed its journey (although not under its own power) to 
the Crystal Mountain property. 
Exhibit 3 received in evidence at the trial is a copy of 
a photograph of a sheepsfoot. 
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28. Mr. Max L. Smith moved the sheepsfoot from Oaker Hills 
to Crystal Mountain about 2 weeks later. 
29. The D-7 had suffered a cracked cylinder head as a 
result of being operated without coolant. Consequently, Mr. Max 
L. Smith began to disassemble it in order to make the necessary 
repairs. He removed the hood, the radiator, the intake manifold 
and the cylinder heads. 
30. During the next several months, some repairs were done. 
However, the D-7 was left partially disassembled and covered with 
a blue tarp through the winter of 1990-1991. 
31. Plaintiff Romona Smith paid various sums of money for 
parts and labor to repair the D-7, as follows: 
|| Date 
14 Sep 1990 
14 Sep 1990 
15 Mar 1991 
18 Feb 1991 
18 Feb 1991 
28 Feb 1991 
3 0 Nov 1990 
8 Feb 1991 
Paid to 
Wheeler 
Machinery 
Northwest 
Motor 
Welding, 
Inc. 
Virgil 
Coombs 
Ahlander's 
Max 
Broadhead 
First 
Security 
Bank Visa 
Don Wood 
Virgil 
Coombs 
Amount 
$361.25 
$2,552.76 
$130.00 
$322.58 
$100.00 
$2,686.31 
$300.00 
$50.00 
' Purpose 1 
fuel 
injectors | 
rebuilt 
cylinder 
heads and 
gasket | 
labor 
radiator || 
labor 
cylinder 
heads 
labor || 
labor 
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32. On July 1, 1991 Mr. Charles Cummins, Jr. sent a letter 
to which he had signed his name as chair of the Board of Crystal 
Mountain Property Owners Association. 
a. The letter was addressed: Mr. Max Smith a/c Romona 
(sic) Smith, 485 W 120 N, Orem, Utah 84057. 
b. This is the text of the letter: 
This letter is to advise you that it is our desire to 
have the D-7 dozer located on Section "A" common area 
of Indian Ridge Subdivision removed as soon as 
possible. This equipment has been at the present 
location for approximately one year. If this unit is 
not removed by July 12, 1991, we will consider it to be 
abandoned and will act accordingly. 
33. Mr. Max L. Smith read the letter and asked his mother 
to respond. 
34. On July 8, 1991 Plaintiff Mrs. Romona Smith wrote a 
letter and signed Max's name to it. The letter was addressed to: 
Crystal Mountain, Property Owners Association, Spanish Fork, 
Utah. Partial text of the letter is: 
Dear Sir: 
I am very sorry to have left the tractor there so 
long. The man that was to have finished fixing 
it...moved not telling me where he went...I am trying 
to find someone else to do this. 
I have four lots there. I know how much you must 
want me to get the tractor moved. I will try to do so 
real soon. 
Thank you so much for your patience of such a long 
time. 
35. Mr. Cummins received the response written by Mrs. 
Smith. 
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36. On July 27, 1991 Mr. Cummins signed his name to a 
letter addressed to "Mountainville Ent., Mt. Pleasant, Ut." 
Partial text of the letter is as follows: 
Dear Sir: 
You are hereby authorized to remove the D-7 Cat 
from the Crystal Mountain development as soon as 
possible. The machine belongs to Mr. Max Smith who 
currently resides at 485 West 120 North, Orem, Ut. 
37. Sometime prior to August 13, 1991 Domonic Bonino asked 
Doug Shelley to move the D-7 from Crystal Mountain to Mr. 
Shelley's property. 
38. Mr. Shelley asked Mr. Branch Cox to assist in the 
effort, since Mr. Shelley's equipment trailer was not equal to 
the task of hauling a piece of equipment of the size and weight 
of the D-7. 
39. On August 13, 1991 both the D-7 and the sheepsfoot were 
in Sanpete County, Utah on property known as Crystal Mountain 
Subdivision. (This finding was part of the parties' 
stipulation.) 
40. On August 13, 1991 the D-7 was not operable because 
a. it had no radiator; 
b. the intake manifold was not connected to the 
engine block; and 
c. the exhaust stack was detached. 
41. On August 13, 1991 defendant Doug Shelley, assisted by 
Mr. Branch Cox, moved both the D-7 and the sheepsfoot from the 
Crystal Mountain Subdivision to Mr. Shelley's property in Sanpete 
County, Utah. (This finding was part of the parties' 
stipulation.) 
9 
42. Defendant Domonic Bonino paid defendant Doug Shelley 
$250 for the work he did in moving the equipment. (This finding 
was part of the parties' stipulation.) 
43. On September 30, 1991, plaintiffs were in court in 
Sanpete County on another matter when they heard Mr. Berry say, 
"...There's already been heavy machinery that's been lost by Mr. 
Smith's inattentiveness, and he left a piece, a D7-Cat on a 
mountain and it's been taken off the mountain by the State of 
Utah; and I'm not sure what the status of that is, but I suspect 
it's gone by now because Mr. Smith had the machinery..." 
44. During the first part of October, 1991 defendant 
Domonic Bonino met with Deena C. Smith at the former's place of 
business. The following conversation occurred: 
Smith: Did you pick up the Cat? It belongs to me 
and Max. 
Bonino: Pay me a thousand dollars for a pick-up fee 
and you can have it back. 
Smith: I can't afford it. You really ought to call 
me Max. He lives with Romona. Here is the 
address and telephone number. 
45. On October 12 or 15, 1991 Plaintiff Romona Smith met 
with defendant Domonic Bonino at the latter's place of business. 
The following conversation occurred: 
Smith: You have a D-7 Cat that belongs to me. 
Bonino: If you had just come yesterday, it was 
sitting right out here in front. I sold it 
to James Schaefer of Fillmore for salvage. 
Smith: Who got the money? 
Bonino: I did. 
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Smith: Who moved it? 
Bonino: Doug Shelley. 
46. Plaintiff Romona Smith called defendant Doug Shelley by 
telephone later that same day. She arranged to meet with him, 
which she did the following day at his place of business. Both 
the D-7 and the sheepsfoot were on Mr. Shelley's property on that 
day. 
47. During the deer-hunt time of 1991 Plaintiff J. Fred 
Smith met with defendant Domonic Bonino at the latter's place of 
business. The following conversation occurred: 
Smith: You have a D-7 Cat and a sheepsfoot. They're 
not yours. The sheepsfoot belongs to Red Z, 
Inc., the cat belongs to Romona or Max Smith. 
We'll pay you whatever you're into them. 
Bonino: The equipment belongs to me. Ross Blackham 
gave me authority. The equipment has been 
disposed of. 
48. On that same day, Plaintiff J. Fred Smith met with 
defendant Doug Shelley at the latter's place of business. The 
following conversation occurred: 
Smith: That's my Cat and my sheepsfoot. 
Shelley: I don't think so. 
Smith: I want them back. Will you haul them to 
Indianola for me? 
49. On November 6, 1991 Darwin C Fisher, acting on behalf 
of plaintiffs J. Fred Smith and Romona Smith, wrote a letter and 
mailed it to defendant Doug Shelley. Partial text of the letter 
is as follows: 
...[Y]ou had no authority or right to take possession 
of the D-7 Caterpillar or Sheeps-Foot and...your 
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continued possession of those items is wrongful. This 
letter is to serve you with written demand to make 
arrangements for delivery of those items to the 
rightful owners Romona Smith and Fred Smith by November 
8, 1991, before 12 o'clock p.m. 
50. Mr. Shelley received the letter and showed it to Mr. 
Bonino. 
51. Mr. Shelley had possession of the D-7 and the 
sheepsfoot as of the time of trial. 
52. The plaintiffs had never met nor known about the 
defendants until after August 13, 1991. 
53. On August 13, 1991 the sheepsfoot was worth $2,800.00 
and $0.00. 
54. During 1991 and 1992 the rental value of a sheepsfoot 
was $600.00 per month. 
55. In 1991, Plaintiff Red Z, Inc. entered into a contract 
with an entity known as Garff Brothers to do road construction 
work in Summit County, Utah. 
56. Road construction work in Summit County is seasonal due 
to adverse weather conditions. 
57. Plaintiff Red Z, Inc. could have used the sheepsfoot 
during the months of August and September 1991 and May, June, 
July, August and September 1992 on the Summit County project. 
58. Plaintiffs filed this action in January of 1992 in 
order to regain possession of their property. They retained 
counsel to assist them, and he has assisted them in this case. 
His fees are reasonable in the sum of $9,981.25. 
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59. Defendants claimed authority to seize and hold the 
property from the Sanpete County Attorney. However, no evidence 
regarding such authority was presented. 
60. The number of days between September 30, 1992 and 
September 8, 1993 is 344. These facts2 lead the Court to 
conclude as follows: 
A. Plaintiff Red Z, Inc. should be awarded judgment 
against defendants that it is the owner of and is entitled to 
possession of the sheepsfoot. Defendants should be ordered to 
deliver possession thereof to it at the property of J. Fred Smith 
near Indianola, Utah within 10 days. 
B. Plaintiff Max L. Smith should be awarded judgement 
against defendants that he is entitled to use and possession of 
the D-7 Caterpillar. He should be ordered to deliver it within 
10 days. Should plaintiff Max L. Smith fail to designate a 
delivery location within 30 days, then he forfeits any ownership 
claims he might have. 
C. Plaintiff Red Z, Inc. should be awarded judgment 
against defendants and they should be ordered to pay money to it 
as follows: 
1. the sum of $4,800.00 (this sum represents eight 
months' rent on the sheepsfoot); 
2
 The parties' stipulation included one other fact, i.e., 
"Defendant Max L. Smith never paid defendant Romona Smith 
any money for use of the D-7 outside of Oaker Hills 
subdivision." 
The court has not adopted this finding as it was not 
useful in resolving any disputed issues. 
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2. the sum of $5,600.00 (this sum represents double 
the value of the sheepsfoot; it is intended as 
punitive damages and is imposed to punish 
defendants for their willful and malicious acts); 
3. the sum of $ 258.76 (this sum represents pre-
judgment interest on $4,800.00 from September 30, 
1992 to September 8, 1993, calculated as follows: 
$4,800.00 times 5.72% times 344 divided by 365). 
D. Plaintiff Max L. Smith should be awarded judgment 
against defendants and they should be ordered to pay to him the 
sum of $3,900.00 (this sum represents triple the value of the D-7 
as of August 13, 1991; it is intended as punitive damages and is 
imposed to punish defendants for their willful and malicious 
acts) . 
E. Plaintiffs Red Z, Inc. and Max L. Smith should be 
awarded judgment and defendants and they should be ordered to pay 
to them the sum of $ 9981.25 (representing attorney's fees). 
F. Defendant should be ordered to pay interest on the 
total judgment at the statutory interest rate. 
G. The judgment should be augmented by the amount of 
reasonable attorney's fees incurred to collect it. 
H. Plaintiffs should be awarded a judgment of "no cause of 
action" against the defendants as to each claim made in their 
counterclaim. 
Rec. at 355-72. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In their docketing statement, Defendants set forth two 
issues which they have neglected to brief. The Utah State 
Supreme Court stated: "We have long held that where an appellant 
fails to brief an issue on appeal, the point is waived." Smith 
v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1992). Issues 7(b) and 
7(e) on Defendants' docketing statement are waived for failure to 
brief the issues on appeal. 
Paragraphs 2 and 6 on page 2 of Appellants' Brief contain 
two issues which Defendants did not properly preserve for appeal 
on Defendants' docketing statement. Failing to preserve the 
issues in the docketing statement results in Defendants waiving 
them for appeal. 
Appellants state: "The Defendants do not contest the 
Findings of Fact entered by the trial court as part of it's 
memorandum Decision." Appellants' Brief page 19. Since 
Defendants do not contest the trial court's Findings of Facts, it 
is assumed that the record supports the findings of the trial 
court. Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991). 
Furthermore, since Defendants have failed to marshal the evidence 
to attack the trial court's Findings of Fact, the trial court's 
Findings of Fact are accepted as valid and to be supported by the 
weight of the evidence. Therefore, an examination of the law 
regarding conversion and an application of the law to the trial 
court's conclusions of law and the application of that law to the 
facts as found by the trial court is necessary. 
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Conversion is: 
an act of wilful interference with a chattel, done without 
lawful justification by which the person entitled thereto is 
deprived of its use and possession. 
Lake Philgas Service v. Valley Bank & Trust Co., 845 P.2d 951, 
959, 204 Utah Adv. Rep. 24 (Ct.App 1993) 
To determine whether the trial court correctly concluded that 
Defendants converted the D-7 caterpillar and the sheepsfoot, the 
trial court must find 3 elements: 
1. an act of wilful interference by Defendants with 
Plaintiffs' D-7 Caterpillar and sheepsfoot; 
2. done without lawful justification; 
3. by which Plaintiffs were deprived of the use and 
possession of the D-7 and sheepsfoot. 
Paragraphs 6, 21, 23, 24, A, and B, in the trial court's 
Findings of Facts, Conclusion of Law, and Order support the trial 
court's conclusion that ownership, use and possession of the 
property were in the Plaintiffs. Paragraphs 37, 41, 42, and 51 
support the trial court's conclusion that Defendants' actions 
constituted an act of wilful interference by Defendants with 
Plaintiffs' D-7 and sheepsfoot. Paragraphs 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 
49, and 50 support the trial court's conclusion that Defendants' 
actions were without lawful justification. Paragraphs 53, 54, 
55, 56, 57, 58, 59, and 60 support the trial court's conclusion 
that Plaintiffs were deprived of the use and possession of the D-
7 Caterpillar and sheepsfoot. The trial court's findings of fact 
are supported by the record. 
Punitive damages require a showing and finding of acts that 
are a result of willful or malicious or intentionally fraudulent 
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conduct, or conduct that manifests a reckless indifference toward 
the rights of others. Defendants set forth ten pages of selected 
facts from the record and from other documents and cases in an 
effort to support their argument that punitive damages are not 
warranted in this case. However, Defendants have failed to 
marshall all evidence in favor of the trial court's findings in 
order to properly attack the trial court's award of punitive 
damages. 
In order to attack a trial court's fact findings, "an 
appellant must marshall all evidence in favor of the facts 
as found by the trial court." Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 
198, 199 (Utah 1991). If the evidence is not properly 
marshalled, we will assume the findings are supported and 
proceed to review "the accuracy of the lower court's 
conclusions of law and the application of that law in the 
case." Id. 
Lake Philaas v. Valley Bank and Trust Company, 845 P.2d 951, 959 
(Utah App. 1993). 
Defendants' failure to marshall the facts, and Defendants' 
attempt to offer carefully selected facts in their own favor 
preclude any attack on the trial court's findings and conclusions 
that Defendants acted willfully and maliciously. 
Paragraphs 36, 37, 41-51, 59, and A-H support the trial 
court's conclusion that Defendants' actions were willful and 
malicious, which findings justify punitive damages. Further, the 
above cited findings of the trial court also support the trial 
court's award of attorney's fees. There is also substantial 
record evidence supporting the trial court's findings. 
Defendants' claim was properly found by the trial court to 
be without merit and lacking in good faith. Defendants' appeal 
17 
is not grounded in fact, is not supported by existing law, and 
does not attempt to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. 
Defendants' appeal is necessarily frivolous, and Plaintiffs are 
entitled to recover attorneys fees resulting from Defendants 
appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
Review of a trial court's conclusions of law are based on a 
correction of error standard, granting no deference to the trial 
court. Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677, 680 (Utah App. 
1989), aff'd, 788 P.2d 520 (Utah 1990), Lake Philgas v. Valley 
Bank and Trust Company, 845 P.2d 951 (Utah App. 1993) . 
On page 21 of Appellants' Brief, Defendants' indicate as 
follows: 
The defendants do not contest the findings of fact entered 
by the trial court as part of its memorandum decision. 
Rather, each of the Defendants challenge the ultimate 
conclusions the trial court reached in determining that each 
of them is liable for conversion of the property of Max L. 
Smith and Red Z. Inc., and the imposition of punitive 
damages, costs and attorney fees against them. 
Since the Defendants do not contest the findings of fact, it 
is assumed that the record supports the findings of the trial 
court. Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198 (Utah 1991). 
II. DEFENDANTS HAVE SET FORTH IN THEIR DOCKETING STATEMENT 
ISSUES WHICH THEY HAVE NOT BRIEFED ON APPEAL. 
In their docketing statement, Defendants preserved two 
issues which they have neglected to brief: 
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Paragraph 7(b) : 
b. Whether the Sixth Judicial District Court erred in 
the computation of actual damages against the 
defendants. 
Paragraph 7(e): 
e. Whether the findings and conclusions of the Sixth 
Judicial District Court are supported by the evidence 
presented at trial. 
Neither of these issues have been briefed by Defendants. The 
Utah State Supreme Court stated: "We have long held that where 
an appellant fails to brief an issue on appeal, the point is 
waived." Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1992). 
Furthermore, the issue set forth in paragraph "e" would 
require a marshalling of the facts; however, Defendants have not 
done so. Because Defendants failed to marshall the facts, and 
because these issues were not properly briefed by Defendants, 
they are abandoned and will not be addressed by Plaintiffs. 
The situation in the case at bar is similar to the situation 
in Smith v. Batchelor. In footnote 4, the court stated: 
In its notice of appeal and its second amended 
docketing statement, Movie Buffs also claimed that the trial 
judge had abused his discretion in refusing to set aside the 
summary judgment or to allow it to withdraw or amend the 
admissions. However, Movie Buffs failed to brief this issue 
before the court. We have long held that where an appellant 
fails to brief an issue on appeal, the point is waived. 
See, e.g. Reid v. Anderson, 116 Utah 455, 460, 211 P.2d 206, 
208 (1949); McFarlane v. Winters, 114 Utah 502, 504, 201 
P.2d 494, 495 (1949); see also Pixon v. State Farm Mutual 
Auto Ins. Co., 809 P.2d 746, 751 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Therefore, we will not review the trial judge's denial of 
Movie Buff's motions. 
Smith v. Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1992). 
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III. APPELLANTS' BRIEF CONTAINS ARGUMENTS ON ISSUES WHICH 
DEFENDANTS DID NOT PROPERLY PRESERVE IN THE DOCKETING 
STATEMENT. 
Defendants improperly briefed the following issues which 
were not properly preserved on appeal: 
Whether the Sixth Judicial District Court erred in 
concluding the Defendants are liable to the Plaintiffs, Max 
L. Smith and Red Z, Inc. when the Plaintiffs did not give 
proof of their identities nor proof of ownership of the D-7 
Caterpillar and the Sheepsfoot to the Defendants? 
Appellants' Brief page 2, paragraph 2. 
Whether the Plaintiffs failed to prove a prima facie case of 
conversion against the Defendants? 
Appellants' Brief page 2, paragraph 6. 
By failing to preserve the issues in the docketing 
statement, Defendants have waived those issues and the appellate 
court should not 'consider them. 
. . . Although the Anopols' counsel raised this argument in 
their brief on appeal, they neglected to appeal this issue 
by filing a notice of appeal and a docketing statement, and 
we therefore decline to consider it. See Utah R. App. P. 3 
& 9. 
Dairvland Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut, Auto Ins. Co., 882 P.2d 
1143, 1146 (Utah 1994). 
Because the issues were not preserved for appeal, they 
should not be considered by the Court. 
IV. APPELLANT HAS NOT MARSHALLED THE EVIDENCE, THEREFORE FACTUAL 
DETERMINATIONS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE BEYOND CHALLENGE. 
In Appellants' Brief, Defendants claim that they are asking 
the court to review the ultimate conclusions of the trial court 
while accepting as correct the findings of fact of the trial 
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court. An obvious difference in standards of review exists 
between reviewing conclusions of law and reviewing findings of 
fact. While Defendants appear to acknowledge the difference, 
Defendants, in the Appellants' Brief, argue the facts even though 
they have not marshalled them. Regardless of how Defendants 
characterize their issues, Appellants' Brief is simply an attempt 
to retry this matter before the appellate court based on selected 
facts set forth by the Defendants. 
What Defendants have done in the case at bar is similar to 
what was done by the appellants in Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold 
Storage et. al. In its brief, Oneida presented six issues, four 
of which were issues of fact and two of which were described as 
issues of law. Upon examination, however, this Court determined 
that, in fact, all six issues were issues of fact, and not legal 
issues. The court stated: 
In other words, the trial court's dismissal of Metalclad's 
damages and liability claims resulted from the trial court's 
findings of fact and not from its application, 
interpretation, or choice of law. Thus despite Oneida's 
characterization, all the issues presented on appeal dispute 
the trial court's findings of fact. 
Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage et. al., 872 P.2d 1051 (Utah 
App. 1994) . 
In the case at bar, Appellants' Brief makes it clear that 
Defendants are attempting to revisit the factual issues of the 
case rather than examine as a matter of law whether the facts 
contained within the court's findings support the conclusions of 
law made by the trial court. This is why Appellants' Brief is 
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full of citations to various parts of the record, and is 
virtually barren of case law. 
When an appellant is challenging the sufficiency of the 
findings of fact of a trial court, a marshalling standard 
applies. In Oneida the court stated: 
Utah appellate courts do not take trial courts' factual 
findings lightly. We repeatedly have set forth the heavy 
burden appellants must bear when challenging factual 
findings. To successfully appeal a trial court's findings 
of fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate. 
"[Attorneys] must extricate [themselves] from the client's 
shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In order 
to properly discharge the [marshalling] duty ..., the 
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious 
order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial 
which supports the very findings the appellant resists," 
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 
(Utah App. 1991); accord In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 
885, 886 (Utah 1989); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 
(Utah 1987); Commercial Union Assoc, v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 
29, 36 (Utah App. 1993); Ohline Corp v. Granite Mill, 849 
P.2d 602, 604 (Utah App. 1993). Once appellants have 
established every pillar supporting their adversary's 
position, they then "must ferret out a fatal flaw in the 
evidence" and show why those pillars fail to support the 
trial court's findings. West Valley City, 818 P.2d at 1314. 
They must show the trial court's findings are "so lacking in 
support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' 
thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" Bartell, 776 P.2d at 
886 (quoting Walker, 743 P.2d at 193). 
Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage et. al., 872 P.2d 1051 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1994). 
Because the Defendants are in effect challenging the factual 
findings of the trial court, yet have failed to marshall the 
evidence, this Court should not consider any factual issues on 
appeal. 
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If the evidence is not properly marshalled, we will assume 
the findings are supported and proceed to review "the 
accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the 
application of that law in the case. 
Lake Philgas, at 959, quoting Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 
199 (Utah 1991) . 
V. SINCE DEFENDANTS DO NOT ATTACK THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF 
FACT, THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE PRESUMED TO BE CORRECT; 
NEVERTHELESS, A BRIEF LOOK AT THE RECORD DEMONSTRATES THAT, 
IN FACT, THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF FACT, WHICH IN 
TURN SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION OF LAW. 
The trial court concluded that the Defendants were liable 
for conversion of the D-7 Caterpillar owned by Plaintiff Max L. 
Smith, and conversion of the sheepsfoot owned by Plaintiff Red Z 
Inc. The trial court's Conclusions of Law are reviewed on appeal 
for correctness. Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199-200 (Utah 
1991). Since Defendants do not contest the trial court's 
Findings of Facts, it is assumed that the record supports the 
findings of the trial court. Saunders, 199. 
Therefore, what remains is to examine the law regarding 
conversion and an application of the law to the trial court's 
Conclusions of Law and the application of that law to the facts 
as found by the trial court. However, since the majority of 
Defendants' argument focuses on the trial court's Findings of 
Fact, brief excerpts from the record will be presented to 
demonstrate that the trial court's findings of fact are supported 
by the record. 
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A. CONVERSION IS AN ACT OF WILFUL INTERFERENCE WITH A 
CHATTEL, DONE WITHOUT LAWFUL JUSTIFICATION BY WHICH THE 
PERSON ENTITLED THERETO IS DEPRIVED OF ITS USE AND 
POSSESSION. 
Conversion is: 
an act of wilful interference with a chattel, done without 
lawful justification by which the person entitled thereto is 
deprived of its use and possession. 
Lake Philcras Service v. Valley Bank & Trust Co., 845 P.2d 951, 
204 Utah Adv. Rep. 24 (Ct.App 1993) (quoting Phillips v. Utah 
State Credit Union, 811 P.2d 174, 179 (Utah 1991) [quoting Allred 
v. Hinklev, 8 Utah 2d 73, 328 P.2d 726, 728 (1958)]). 
Interference can be with, not only, ownership rights but also 
with rights of possession and use. Henderson v. For-Shor Co., 
757 P.2d 465 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). 
In determining whether the trial court correctly concluded 
that Defendants converted the D-7 Caterpillar and the sheepsfoot, 
the trial court must find the following elements: 
1. an act of wilful interference by Defendants with 
Plaintiffs' D-7 Caterpillar and sheepsfoot; 
2. done without lawful justification; 
3. by which Plaintiffs were deprived of the use and 
possession of the D-7 and sheepsfoot. 
1. OWNERSHIP OR POSSESSORY RIGHTS IN THE D-7 AND 
SHEEPSFOOT WAS IN THE PLAINTIFFS. 
Ownership or possessory rights in the D-7 Caterpillar and 
sheepsfoot must be found in the Plaintiffs as a prerequisite of 
conversion by Defendants. The following Findings of Fact by the 
trial court establish that ownership or possessory rights to the 
D-7 Caterpillar and sheepsfoot was in the Plaintiffs: 
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6. Plaintiff Max L. Smith was and is the defendant in a 
divorce action in this Court, case number 9726. A 
decree of divorce was entered in that case on September 
30, 1990. Paragraph 25 of that decree reads as 
follows: 
The Defendant, Max L. Smith, is awarded the use 
and possession of the D7 Caterpillar (sic) subject 
to all liability thereon and holding the Plaintiff 
harmless therefrom. The Plaintiff is reserved the 
right to use said machinery upon twenty-four (24) 
hours notice to the Defendant. The Plaintiff shall 
provide her own fuel. 
21. The D-7 Caterpillar which is the subject of this case 
is the same one referred to in paragraph 25 of the 
decree of divorce in case number 9726. It is equipped 
with an in-line 4-cylinder diesel engine which has two 
cylinder heads, each covering two cylinders. It is an 
older model, probably manufactured in 1954. 
23. The sheepsfoot was purchased by plaintiff J. Fred Smith 
in 1982 and later transferred to Red Z, Inc. 
24. On October 14, 1988 Max L. Smith purchased the D-7 
Caterpillar from Walker Construction Company. (This 
finding was part of the parties' stipulation.) The 
purchase price, $5,250.00, was paid by a check signed 
by Max L. Smith and drawn on a bank account named 
"Oaker Hills." 
R. at 358-61. 
Based on these Findings of Fact, the trial court correctly stated 
in its Conclusions of Law that: 
A. Plaintiff Red Z, Inc. should be awarded judgment 
against defendants that it is the owner of and is 
entitled to possession of the sheepsfoot. Defendants 
should be ordered to deliver possession thereof to it 
at the property of J. Fred Smith near Indianola, Utah 
within 10 days. 
B. Plaintiff Max L. Smith should be awarded judgment 
against defendants that he is entitled to use and 
possession of the D-7 Caterpillar. He should be ordered 
to designate a location within Utah to which defendants 
should be ordered to deliver it within 10 days. Should 
Plaintiff Max L. Smith fail to designate a delivery 
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location within 30 days, then he forfeits any ownership 
claim he might have. 
R. at 369-70. 
Although Defendants stated that they do not contest the 
trial court's Findings of Fact, and although Defendants failed to 
marshal the evidence, Defendants have attempted to argue that the 
trial court's finding that Max L. Smith is the owner or has right 
to possession of the D-7 goes against the great weight of the 
evidence presented at trial. See Appellants' Brief page 28. 
However, the following are some facts from the trial 
transcript which support the trial court's finding that ownership 
or possessory rights in the D-7 Caterpillar and Sheepsfoot rest 
in the Plaintiffs: 
1. The parties stipulated at the beginning of the trial 
that Fred Smith and Red Z, Inc. owned the sheepsfoot 
prior to June 15, 1990. Volume 1, page 22, lines 10-
15. 
2. Fred Smith testified that Red Z, Inc. owned the 
sheepsfoot. Vol. 1, pg. 52, Ins. 11-21. 
3. Fred Smith told the Defendant Dominic Bonino, that the 
sheepsfoot belonged to Red Z, Inc. Vol 1, pg. 71, Ins. 
13-25, pg. 72, Ins. 1-14. 
4. Plaintiff Romona Smith showed Defendant Bonino a bill 
of sale. Vol. 2, pg. 83, Ins. 2-12, pg. 84, Ins. 17-
23. 
5. Plaintiff Romona Smith also believed she showed the 
bill of sale to Defendant Shelley. Vol. 2, pg. 84, 
Ins. 24-25, pg. 85, Ins. 1-2. 
6. Shelley acknowledged that Plaintiff Romona Smith had 
told him that she owned the D-7. Vol. 4, pg. 100, Ins. 
22-24. 
7. Defendant Bonino told Defendant Shelley that Defendant 
Bonino thought that Plaintiff Max Smith owned the D-7. 
Vol. 4, pg. 128, Ins. 13-16. 
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8. Defendant Shelley was told by Andrew Berry that 
Plaintiff Max Smith owned equipment. Vol. 4, pg. 128, 
In. 25, pg. 129, Ins. 1-2. 
9. Defendant Bonino testified that he was told by Deena 
Smith that she and Plaintiff Max Smith owned the D-7 
and that Defendant Bonino should contact Plaintiff Max 
Smith. Vol. 3, pg. 169, Ins. 12-25, pg. 170, Ins. 1-
13. 
10. Defendant Bonino admitted that Plaintiff Romona Smith 
told him that she owned the D-7. Vol. 3, pg. 172, Ins. 
13-18. 
11. Defendant Bonino admitted that Fred Smith told him that 
Fred owned the Sheepsfoot. Vol. 3, pg. 196, Ins. 5-7. 
12. Defendant Bonino admitted in testimony that he knew 
that the association did not own the equipment. Vol 3, 
pg. 196, Ins. 20-23. 
13. Cummins testified that the association never believed 
that it owned the D-7. Vol. 3, pg. 127, Ins. 21-23. 
14. Cummins also testified that the association did not 
give title to Defendants for the D-7. Vol. 3, pg. 128, 
Ins. 22-24. 
15. He also testified that the association never took steps 
to abandon the D-7. Vol. 3, pg. 129, Ins 13-18. 
The trial court, therefore, properly found that ownership or 
right to possession of the D-7 Caterpillar was in Plaintiff Max 
L. Smith, and that ownership in the sheepsfoot was in Plaintiff 
Red Z, Inc. 
2. DEFENDANTS' ACTIONS CONSTITUTED WILFUL 
INTERFERENCE WITH PLAINTIFFS' D-7 CATERPILLAR AND 
SHEEPSFOOT. 
After finding that ownership or right to possession is in 
the Plaintiffs, it must be found, as an element of conversion, 
that Defendants' actions constituted wilful interference with 
Plaintiffs' D-7 Caterpillar and sheepsfoot. In the following 
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Findings of Fact, the trial court established that the 
Defendants' actions constituted an act of wilful interference by 
Defendants with Plaintiffs' D-7 and sheepsfoot: 
37. Sometime prior to August 13, 1991 Domonic Bonino asked 
Doug Shelley to move the D-7 from Crystal Mountain to 
Mr. Shelley's property. 
41. On August 13, 1991 defendant Doug Shelly, assisted by 
Mr. Branch Cox, moved both the D-7 and the sheepsfoot 
from the Crystal Mountain Subdivision to Mr. Shelley's 
property in Sanpete County, Utah. (This finding was 
part of the parties' stipulation.) 
42. Defendant Domonic Bonino paid defendant Dough Shelly 
$250 for the work he did in moving the equipment. (This 
finding was part of the parties'stipulation.) 
51. Mr. Shelley had possession of the D-7 and the 
sheepsfoot as of the time of trial. 
R. at 365-68. 
The following are some facts from the trial transcript which 
support the trial court's finding that Defendants' actions 
constituted wilful interference with Plaintiffs' D-7 Caterpillar 
and sheepsfoot: 
1. Defendant Shelley told Defendant Bonino that Plaintiffs 
were willing to pay transportation and storage fees. 
Vol. 5, pg. 199, Ins. 7-16. 
2. Defendant Bonino testified that he didn't contact 
Plaintiff Max Smith before moving the equipment from 
Crystal Mountain. Vol 3, pg. 190. Ins. 3-8. 
3. Defendant Bonino testified that he never received title 
to the equipment. Vol. 3, pg. 197, Ins. 19-25. 
4. Cummins testified that Defendants were told that the 
Association would assume no liability resulting from 
the removal of the equipment. Vol. 3, pg. 127, Ins. 6-
20. 
5. Defendant Bonino told Defendant Shelley that Bonino 
owned the equipment. Vol. 4, pg. 128, Ins. 17-24. 
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6. Defendant Shelley that Plaintiffs Romona Smith and Fred 
Smith offered to pay for the equipment and storage. 
Vol. 4, pg. 131, Ins. 8-16, Vol. 4, pg. 132, Ins. 5-19. 
7. Defendant Shelley told Defendant Bonino that Plaintiffs 
Fred Smith and Romona Smith offered to pay costs. Vol. 
4, pg. 132, Ins. 20-25, pg. 133, Ins. 1-4. 
The trial court, therefore, correctly found that Defendants' 
actions constituted wilful interference with Plaintiffs' D-7 
Caterpillar and sheepsfoot by removing them from the Crystal 
Mountain property, taking possession, and refusing to return the 
equipment to Plaintiffs. 
3. DEFENDANTS' INTERFERENCE WITH PLAINTIFFS' PROPERTY 
WAS DONE WITHOUT LAWFUL JUSTIFICATION. 
It must next be found, as an element of conversion, that 
Defendants' actions, constituting wilful interference with 
Plaintiffs' D-7 Caterpillar and sheepsfoot, were done without 
lawful justification. In the following Findings of Fact, the 
trial court established that the Defendants' actions were without 
lawful justification: 
44. During the first part of October, 1991 defendant 
Domonic Bonino met with Deena C. Smith at the former's 
place of business. The following conversation occurred: 
Smith: Did you pick up the Cat? It belongs to 
me and Max. 
Bonino: Pay me a thousand dollars for a pick-up 
fee and you can have it back. 
Smith: I can't afford it. You really ought to 
call Max. He lives with Romona. Here is 
the address and telephone number:.... 
45. On October 12 or 15, 1991 plaintiff Romona Smith met 
with defendant Domonic Bonino at the latter's place of 
business. The following conversation occurred: 
Smith: You have a D-7 Cat that belongs to me. 
Bonino: If you had just come yesterday, it was 
sitting right out here in front. I sold 
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it to James Schaefer of Fillmore for 
salvage. 
Smith: Who got the money? 
Bonino: I did. 
Smith: Who moved it? 
Bonino: Doug Shelley. 
Plaintiff Romona Smith called defendant Doug Shelley by 
telephone later that same day. She arranged to meet 
with him, which she did the following day at his place 
of business. Both the D-7 and the sheepsfoot were on 
Mr. Shelley's property on that day. 
During the deer-hunt time of 1991 Plaintiff J. Fred 
Smith met with Defendant Domonic Bonino at the latter's 
place of business. The following conversation 
occurred: 
Smith: You have a D-7 Cat and a sheepsfoot. 
They're not yours. The sheepsfoot 
belongs to Red Z, Inc., the Cat belongs 
to Romona or Max Smith. We'll pay you 
whatever you're into them. 
Bonino: The equipment belongs to me. Ross 
Blackham gave me authority. The 
equipment has been disposed of. 
On that same day, plaintiff J. Fred Smith met with 
defendant Dough Shelley at the latter's place of 
business. The following conversation occurred: 
Smith: That's my cat and my sheepsfoot. 
Shelley: I don't think so. 
Smith: I want them back. Will you haul them to 
Indianola for me? 
On November 6, 1991 Darwin C. Fisher, acting on behalf 
of plaintiffs J. Fred Smith and Romona Smith, wrote a 
letter and mailed it to defendant Dough Shelley. 
Partial text of the letter is as follows: 
...[Y]ou had no authority or right to take 
possession of the D-7 Caterpillar or Sheeps-Foot 
and ...your continued possession of those items is 
wrongful. This letter is to serve you with written 
demand to make arrangements for delivery of those 
items to the rightful owners Romona Smith and Fred 
Smith by November 8, 1991, before 12 o'clock p.m. 
Mr. Shelley received the letter and showed it to Mr. 
Bonino. 
68 
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The trial court found that Defendants were not only notified 
in person by Plaintiffs that they wrongfully possessed 
Plaintiffs' property, but Defendants were also notified of their 
wrongful possession of the property when they received the letter 
from Plaintiffs' legal counsel informing them of their wrongful 
possession and need to return the property promptly. Defendants 
were not only notified of Plaintiff Max L. Smith's ownership or 
possessory rights in the D-7 after they assumed control and 
possession of the property, but they were also notified prior to 
their wrongful interference by Mr. Cummins letter. The trial 
court found that: 
36. On July 27, 1991 Mr. Cummins signed his nameto a 
letter addressed to "Mountainville Ent., Mt. Pleasant, 
Ut." Partial text of the letter is as follows: 
Dear Sir: 
You are hereby authorized to remove the D-7 
Cat from the Crystal Mountain development as soon 
as possible. The machine belongs to Max Smith who 
currently resides at 485 West 120 North, Orem, Ut. 
R. at 364. 
Most interesting is the fact that Mr. Berry, attorney for 
Defendants, knew that ownership or right to possession of the D-7 
was in Plaintiff Max L. Smith because Mr. Berry was the same 
person who drafted the Divorce Decree in Civil #9726 where 
Plaintiff Max L. Smith was awarded possession of the D-7. 
Defendants argue that the trial court's Findings of Fact 
number 36 supports their argument that Defendants were not 
without lawful justification for their interference. Defendants 
argue that the letter from Mr. Cummins was sufficient 
authorization to act as they did. However, in order to have 
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received proper authority from Mr. Cummins, Mr. Cummins must 
first have had authority. Mr. Cummins did not have authority to 
order removal of the property. The letter from Mr. Cummins gave 
Defendants the right to enter the association's property in order 
to remove it and nothing more. The letter was clear that the 
association would not accept liability for removal; thus, 
acknowledging they had no right to remove the property. Had 
removal been desired, it was incumbent upon Mr. Cummins to notify 
the law enforcement agency whose authority extends to the area 
where the item was found. Consequently, disposition of the 
property would have been left to the law enforcement agency. 
In the alternative, Defendants argued that they had been 
given authority to seize and hold the D-7 and sheepsfoot from the 
Sanpete County Attorney. However, the trial court found that 
Defendants failed to present any evidence regarding such 
authority. R. at 369. 
Defendants offer 18 Am. Jur. Conversion §63, p. 197 to argue 
that Plaintiffs should have demanded the property and shown 
ownership rights or authorization to act on behalf of the owner. 
That section states that a demand and refusal may be necessary to 
constitute a conversion. Defendants argue that they could not 
turn over the property without a demand and proof of ownership or 
agency authority from Plaintiffs J. Fred Smith and Romona Smith. 
This argument is inconsistent in two respects. First, how 
is it that Defendants needed identification or proof of authority 
from Plaintiffs when Defendants were aware that the property 
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belonged to Plaintiffs? Second, had the proof of authority 
really been the reason for refusing to return the property, why 
did Defendants inform Plaintiffs, the first time Plaintiffs 
contacted them regarding the property, that regardless of 
Plaintiffs rights in the property, they had already sold and 
disposed of the property? 
Interestingly, 18 Am. Jur. Conversion, §63, p. 197, also 
states that a demand is necessary unless there is an assumption 
of ownership, wrongful use, or any act of conversion prior to the 
demand. Defendants fail to recognize that the trial court 
specifically found the existence of these circumstances in the 
case at bar. 
The trial court specifically noted that the first demand for 
the property by Plaintiffs was made to Defendant Domonic Bonino 
by Plaintiff Romona Smith. 
On October 12 or 15, 1991, Plaintiff Romona Smith met with 
Defendant Domonic Bonino at the latter's place of business. 
The following conversation occurred: 
Smith: You have a D-7 Cat that belongs to me. 
Bonino: If you had just come yesterday, it was 
sitting right out here in front. I sold it 
to James Schaefer of Fillmore for salvage. 
Smith: Who got the money? 
Bonino: I did. 
Smith: Who moved it? 
Bonino: Doug Shelley. 
R. at 366-67. 
The trial court specifically noted a second demand for the 
property by Plaintiffs. 
During the deer-hunt time of 1991 Plaintiff J. Fred Smith 
met with Defendant Domonic Bonino at the latter7s place of 
business. The following conversation occurred: 
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Smith: You have a D-7 Cat and a sheepsfoot. They're 
not yours. The sheepsfoot belongs to Red Z, 
Inc., the Cat belongs to Romona or Max Smith. 
We'll pay you whatever you're into them. 
Bonino: The equipment belongs to me. Ross Blackham 
gave me authority. The equipment has been 
disposed of. 
R. at 367. 
Note, that after each demand, Plaintiffs were informed that 
the property had been sold or disposed of; thereby, Defendants 
demonstrated an act of conversion, negating the need for a 
demand. 
Defendants' failure to return Plaintiffs' property upon 
demand resulted in a wilful interference without lawful 
justification. The only justification which Defendants might 
have had may have been a lien on the costs for moving the 
property. However, the trial court found that Defendants were 
offered reimbursement for their expenses and storage fees. 
Smith: You have a D-7 Cat and a sheepsfoot. They're 
not yours. The sheepsfoot belongs to Red Z, 
Inc., the Cat belongs to Romona or Max Smith. 
We'll pay you whatever you're into them. 
R. at 367. 
Further, the Defendants did nothing to properly perfect any lien 
they may have had on the property. 
The trial court, therefore, correctly concluded that 
Defendants' wilful interference with Plaintiffs' D-7 Caterpillar 
and sheepsfoot by removing them from the Crystal Mountain 
property, taking possession, and refusing to return the equipment 
to Plaintiffs was without lawful justification. 
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4. PLAINTIFFS WERE DEPRIVED OF THE USE AND POSSESSION 
OF THE D-7 AND SHEEPSFOOT. 
It must next be found, as the final element of conversion, 
that Plaintiffs were deprived of the use and possession of the D-
7 Caterpillar and sheepsfoot. In the following Findings of Fact, 
the trial court established that the Plaintiffs were deprived of 
the use and possession of the equipment: 
53. On August 13, 1991 the sheepsfoot was worth $2,800.00, 
the D-7 Caterpillar was worth $1,300.00. On the last 
day of trial the respective values were $2,800.00 and 
$0.00. 
54. During 1991 and 1992 the rental value of a sheepsfoot 
was $600.00 per month. 
55. In 1991 plaintiff Red Z, Inc. entered into a contract 
with an entity known as Garff Brothers to do road 
construction work in Summit County, Utah, 
56. Road construction work in Summit County is seasonal due 
to adverse weather conditions. 
57. Plaintiff Red Z, Inc. could have used the sheepsfoot 
during the months of August and September 1991 and May, 
June, July, August and September 1992 on the Summit 
County project. 
58. Plaintiffs filed this action in January of 1992 in 
order to regain possession of their property. They 
retained counsel to assist them, and he has assisted 
them in this case. His fees are reasonable in the sum 
of $9981.25. 
59. Defendants claimed authority to seize and hod the 
property from the Sanpete County Attorney. However, no 
evidence regarding such authority was presented. 
60. The number of days between September 30, 1992 and 
September 8, 1993 is 344. 
R. at 368-69. 
The trial court, therefore, correctly concluded that 
Plaintiffs were deprived of the use and possession of the D-7 
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Caterpillar and sheepsfoot from August 13, 1991, to the date of 
the trial. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION OF LAW IS SUPPORTED BY THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT, WHICH ARE SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. 
As indicated by the preceding analysis, even without the 
presumption that the Findings of Fact are supported by the 
record, the trial court's conclusion that Defendants converted 
Plaintiffs' D-7 Caterpillar and sheepsfoot is correct. The trial 
court's Findings of Fact support the Conclusion of Law, and the 
facts produced at trial support the trial court's Findingrs of 
Fact. Ownership or possessory rights in the property was in the 
Plaintiffs; Defendants exercised dominion and control over the 
property without justification and inconsistent with the 
Plaintiffs' rights; and, Plaintiffs were deprived of the use and 
possession of the equipment for a significant period of time. 
The trial court also properly found that the Defendants acted 
knowingly and with disregard of the Plaintiffs' ownership or 
possessory rights. 
VI. DEFENDANTS' FAILURE TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE PRECLUDES AN 
ATTACK ON THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
As stated in Appellants' Brief, punitive damages require a 
showing and finding of acts that are a result of willful or 
malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that 
manifests a reckless indifference toward the rights of others. 
Defendants attack the trial court's award of punitive damages. 
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Beginning on page 35 of Appellants' Brief, Defendants set 
forth ten pages of selected facts from the record and from other 
documents and cases in an effort to support their argument that 
punitive damages are not warranted in this case. However, 
Defendants have failed to marshall all evidence in favor of the 
above listed facts found by the trial court in order to properly 
attack the trial court's award of punitive damages. 
In order to attack a trial court's fact findings, "an 
appellant must marshall all evidence in favor of the facts 
as found by the trial court." Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 
198, 199 (Utah 1991). If the evidence is not properly 
marshalled, we will assume the findings are supported and 
proceed to review "the accuracy of the lower court's 
conclusions of law and the application of that law in the 
case." Ld. Valley Bank has failed to marshall the evidence 
supporting the above quoted finding or other findings of the 
court which further support this finding. We therefore 
assume there is sufficient evidence in the record to support 
the court's findings that Valley Bank's conduct was willful 
and intentional. 
Lake Philgas v. Valley Bank and Trust Company, 845 P.2d 951, 959 
(Utah App. 1993). 
Similarly, Defendants' failure to marshall the facts, and 
Defendants' attempt to offer carefully selected facts in their 
own favor preclude any attack on the trial court's findings and 
conclusions that Defendants acted willfully and maliciously. 
VII. THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL RECORD EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
DETERMINATION THAT DEFENDANTS' ACTIONS WERE WILLFUL AND 
MALICIOUS• 
In deciding whether punitive damages should be awarded the 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Such damages may be awarded "where the nature of the wrong 
complained of and the injury inflicted goes beyond merely 
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violating the rights of another in that it is found to be 
willful and malicious." Elkington v. Foust, Utah, 618 P.2d 
37 (1980); Kesler v. Rogers, supra, note 7; Prince v. 
Peterson, Utah, 538 P.2d 1325 (1975). 
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. J.B.J. Feedvards, Inc., et 
al., 653 P.2d 591, 598-99 (Utah 1982). 
Furthermore, 
The purposes of punitive damages are well stated in Kesler 
v. Rogers. They are: a punishment of the defendant for 
particularly grievous injury caused by conduct which is not 
only wrongful, but which is wilful and malicious so that it 
seems to one's sense of justice that mere recompense for 
actual loss is inadequate and that the plaintiff should have 
added compensation; and that the defendant should suffer 
some additional penalty for that character of wrongful 
conduct; and also that such a verdict should serve as a 
wholesome warning to others not to engage in similar 
misdoings. 542 P.2d at 359. Accord Branch v. Western 
Petroleum, Inc., Utah, 657 P.2d 267 (1982). 
Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 312 (Utah 
1982) . 
The legal standard for awarding punitive damages is fact-specific 
"such that the determination as to whether punitive damages are 
awarded is 'within the sound discretion and province of the 
jury;'11 or, in this case, the court. Mark VII Financial 
Consultants Corp. v. Smedley and First National Bank of Lavton, 
792 P.2d 130, 134 (Utah Ct.App. 1990)(citing Biswell v. Duncan, 
742 P.2d 80, 86 (Utah Ct.App.1987) ) . 
The following findings and conclusions by the trial court 
support the trial court's award of punitive damages in the case 
at bar: 
36. On July 27, 1991 Mr. Cummins signed his name to a 
letter addressed to "Mountainvilie Ent., Mt. Pleasant, 
Ut." Partial text of the letter is as follows: 
Dear Sir: 
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You are hereby authorized to remove the D-7 Cat 
from the Crystal Mountain development as soon as 
possible. The machine belongs to Mr. Max Smith who 
currently resides at 485 West 120 North, Orem, Ut. 
Sometime prior to August 13, 1991 Domonic Bonino asked 
Doug Shelley to move the D-7 from Crystal Mountain to 
Mr. Shelley's property. 
On August 13, 1991 defendant Doug Shelley, assisted Mr. 
Branch Cox, moved both the D-7 and the sheepsfoot from 
the Crystal Mountain Subdivision to Mr. Shelley's 
property in Sanpete County, Utah. (This finding was 
part of the parties' stipulation.) 
Defendant Domonic Bonino paid defendant Doug Shelley 
$250 for the work he did in moving the equipment. 
(This finding was part of the parties' stipulation.) 
On September 30, 1991, plaintiffs were in court in 
Sanpete County on another matter when they heard Mr. 
Berry say, "...There's already been heavy machinery 
that's been lost by Mr. Smith's inattentiveness, and he 
left a piece, a D7-Cat on a mountain and it's been 
taken off the mountain by the State of Utah; and I'm 
not sure what the status of that is, but I suspect it's 
gone by now because Mr. Smith had the machinery..." 
During the first part of October, 1991 defendant 
Domonic Bonino met with Deena C. Smith at the former's 
place of business. The following conversation 
occurred: 
Smith: Did you pick up the Cat? It belongs to me 
and Max. 
Bonino: Pay me a thousand dollars for a pick-up fee 
and you can have it back. 
Smith: I can't afford it. You really ought to call 
me Max. He lives with Romona. 
Here is the address and telephone 
number. 
On October 12 or 15, 1991 Plaintiff Romona Smith met 
with defendant Domonic Bonino at the latter's place of 
business. The following conversation occurred: 
Smith: You have a D-7 Cat that belongs to me. 
Bonino: If you had just come yesterday, it was 
sitting right out here in front. I sold it 
to James Schaefer of Fillmore for salvage. 
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Smith: Who got the money? 
Bonino: I did. 
Smith: Who moved it? 
Bonino: Doug Shelley. 
46. Plaintiff Romona Smith called defendant Doug Shelley by 
telephone later that same day. She arranged to meet 
with him, which she did the following day at his place 
of business. Both the D-7 and the sheepsfoot were on 
Mr. Shelley's property on that day. 
47. During the deer-hunt time of 1991 Plaintiff J. Fred 
Smith met with defendant Domonic Bonino at the latter's 
place of business, 
occurred: 
The following conversation 
48 
Smith: You have a D-7 Cat and a sheepsfoot. They're 
not yours. The sheepsfoot belongs to Red Z, 
Inc., the cat belongs to Romona or Max Smith. 
We'll pay you whatever you're into them. 
Bonino: The equipment belongs to me. Ross Blackham 
gave me authority. The equipment has been 
disposed of. 
On that same day, Plaintiff J. Fred Smith met with 
defendant Doug Shelley at the latter's place of 
business. The following conversation occurred: 
Smith: That's my Cat and my sheepsfoot. 
Shelley: I don't think so. 
Smith: I want them back. Will you haul them to 
Indianola for me? 
49. On November 6, 1991 Darwin C Fisher, acting on behalf 
of plaintiffs J. Fred Smith and Romona Smith, wrote a 
letter and mailed it to defendant Doug Shelley. 
Partial text of the letter is as follows: 
...[Y]ou had no authority or right to take possession 
of the D-7 Caterpillar or Sheeps-Foot and...your 
continued possession of those items is wrongful. This 
letter is to serve you with written demand to make 
arrangements for delivery of those items to the 
rightful owners Romona Smith and Fred Smith by November 
8, 1991, before 12 o'clock p.m. 
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50. Mr. Shelley received the letter and showed it to Mr. 
Bonino. 
51. Mr. Shelley had possession of the D-7 and the 
sheepsfoot as of the time of trial. 
59. Defendants claimed authority to seize and hold the 
property from the Sanpete County Attorney. However, no 
evidence regarding such authority was presented. 
A. Plaintiff Red Z, Inc. should be awarded judgment 
against defendants that it is the owner of and is 
entitled to possession of the sheepsfoot. Defendants 
should be ordered to deliver possession thereof to it 
at the property of J. Fred Smith near Indianola, Utah 
within 10 days. 
B. Plaintiff Max L. Smith should be awarded judgement 
against defendants that he is entitled to use and 
possession of the D-7 Caterpillar. He should be 
ordered to deliver it within 10 days. Should plaintiff 
Max L. Smith fail to designate a delivery location 
within 3 0 days, then he forfeits any ownership claims 
he might have. 
C. Plaintiff Red Z, Inc. should be awarded judgment 
against defendants and they should be ordered to pay 
money to it as follows: 
1. the sum of $4,800.00 (this sum represents eight 
months' rent on the sheepsfoot); 
2. the sum of $5,600.00 (this sum represents double 
the value of the sheepsfoot; it is intended as 
punitive damages and is imposed to punish 
defendants for their willful and malicious acts) ; 
3. the sum of $ 258.76 (this sum represents pre-
judgment interest on $4,800.00 from September 30, 
1992 to September 8, 1993, calculated as follows: 
$4,800.00 times 5.72% times 344 divided by 365). 
D. Plaintiff Max L. Smith should be awarded judgment 
against defendants and they should be ordered to pay to 
him the sum of $3,900.00 (this sum represents triple 
the value of the D-7 as of August 13, 1991; it is 
intended as punitive damages and is imposed to punish 
defendants for their willful and malicious acts). 
E. Plaintiffs Red Z, Inc. and Max L. Smith should be 
awarded judgment and defendants and they should be 
ordered to pay to them the sum of $ 9981.25 
(representing attorney's fees). 
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F. Defendant should be ordered to pay interest on the 
total judgment at the statutory interest rate. 
G. The judgment should be augmented by the amount of 
reasonable attorney's fees incurred to collect it. 
H. Plaintiffs should be awarded a judgment of "no cause of 
action" against the defendants as to each claim made in 
their counterclaim. 
R. at 364-71. 
These findings and conclusions support the trial court's finding 
of willful and malicious conduct by Defendants, which justifies 
punitive damages. Further, when reviewing the trial court's 
award of punitive damages the appellate courts: 
give adequate deference to the advantaged position of the 
trial judge to appraise the witnesses and the evidence. 
Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 817 p.2d 809, 811 (Utah 
1991) . 
Based on the findings and conclusions listed above, the 
trial court found, and the record supports, that Defendants' 
conduct was willful and malicious warranting the imposition of 
punitive damages. 
In determining the amount of punitive damages, the fact 
finder should consider the following factors: 
the nature of the alleged misconduct of the defendant, the 
extent of the effect of the misconduct on the lives of the 
plaintiff and others, the probability of future recurrence 
of such misconduct, the relationship between the parties, 
the relative wealth of the defendant, the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the misconduct and the amount of 
actual damages awarded. 
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. at 599. 
Defendants argue that the trial court did not consider these 
seven factors in assessing punitive damages, and that it did not 
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enter findings supporting the amount of punitive damages awarded. 
However, Defendants have failed to marshall all evidence, which 
marshalling would show that the record contains sufficient facts 
regarding the seven factors on which the trial court could base 
its decision. The trial court is not required to list the seven 
factors as findings of fact. It is sufficient that facts 
regarding the factors are contained in the record. Arnica Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 967 (Utah Ct.App. 
1989) . 
Further, 
The trial court has broad discretion in weighing these 
factors and determining an appropriate award, and we will 
not disturb its conclusions absent an abuse of discretion. 
See Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 
312 (Utah 1982) . 
Id. at 967. 
Punitive damages, and the amount imposed by the trial court, 
were supported by the trial court's findings of fact, which were 
supported by substantial record evidence. 
Further, the above cited findings and conclusions also 
support the trial court's award of attorney's fees. 
As a general rule, a prevailing party to a lawsuit is not 
entitled to attorney fees unless there is a contractual or 
statutory basis for the award. Some courts have recognized 
an exception to the general rule by allowing a plaintiff to 
recover attorney fees incurred in regaining possession of 
converted property. See 18 Am.Jur.2d Conversion s 120 
(1985); Gladstone v. Hillel, 203 Cal.App.3d 977, 250 
Cal.Rptr. 372, 380-81 (1988); Motors Ins. Corp. v. 
Singleton, 677 S.W.2d 309, 315 (Ky.Ct.App.1984). 
Broadwater v. Old Republic Surety, 854 P.2d 527, 531 (Utah 1993). 
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Utah Code Annotated Section 78-27-56 states: 
In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable 
attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court 
determines that the action or defense to the action was 
without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith.... 
Two conditions must be met to qualify under this statute. First, 
the claim must be without merit, and second, it must be asserted 
in bad faith. 
To establish that a claim is "without merit", a party must 
first demonstrate that the claim is "frivolous" or "of little 
weight or importance having no basis in law or fact. Jeschke v. 
Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 203 (Utah Ct.App. 1991) . Asserting a claim 
or defense knowing that it has no basis in law or fact evidences 
a disregard for the truth and a lack of an honest belief in the 
propriety of the assertion. In other words, it lacks good faith. 
In Jeschke. the trial court determined, and this Court affirmed, 
that: 
Jeschke knew he had no factual basis for his claims. 
Jeschke's purposeful disregard for truth and his 
misrepresentations of material facts evidences that he 
lacked an honest belief in the propriety of his activities. 
Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 204 (Utah Ct.App. 1991). 
Similarly, in the case at bar, the trial court found that 
Defendants knew they had no factual basis for their claims, and 
their defense was a purposeful disregard for the truth. 
Beginning with the first communication to Defendants 
concerning the property, Defendants knew that Plaintiffs owned 
the property. 
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36. On July 27, 1991 Mr. Cummins signed his name to a 
letter addressed to "Mountainville Ent., Mt. Pleasant, 
Ut." Partial text of the letter is as follows: 
Dear Sir: 
You are hereby authorized to remove the D-7 Cat 
from the Crystal Mountain development as soon as 
possible. The machine belongs to Mr. Max Smith who 
currently resides at 485 West 120 North, Orem, Ut. 
44. During the first part of October, 1991 defendant 
Domonic Bonino met with Deena C. Smith at the former's 
place of business. The following conversation 
occurred: 
Smith: Did you pick up the Cat? It belongs to me 
and Max. 
Bonino: Pay me a thousand dollars for a pick-up fee 
and you can have it back. 
Smith: I can't afford it. You really ought to call 
me Max. He lives with Romona. Here is the 
address and telephone number. 
R. at 364, 366. 
When the Defendants were approached by Plaintiffs, and even 
contacted by Plaintiffs' counsel, Defendants, with calloused 
attitude, dismissed Plaintiffs' efforts to recover the property, 
including offers to pay recovery and transportation costs, and 
manifested a blatant disregard for Plaintiffs' rights. 
45. On October 12 or 15, 1991 plantiff Romona Smith met 
with defendant Domonic Bonino at the latter's place of 
business. The following conversation occurred: 
Smith: You have a D-7 Cat that belongs to me. 
Bonino: If you had just come yesterday, it was 
sitting right out here in front. I sold it 
to James Schaefer of Fillmore for salvage. 
Smith: Who got the money? 
Bonino: I did. 
Smith: Who moved it? 
Bonino: Doug Shelley. 
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46. Plantiff Romona Smith called defendant Doug Shelley by 
telephone later that same day. She arranged to meet 
with him, which she did the following day at his place 
of business. Both the D-7 and the sheepsfoot were on 
Mr. Shelley's property on that day. 
47. During the deer-hunt time of 1991 plantiff J. Fred 
Smith met with defedant Domonic Bonino at the latter's 
place of business. The following conversation 
occurred: 
Smith: You have a D-7 Cat and a sheepsfoot. They're 
not yours. The sheepsfoot belongs to Red Z, 
Inc., the cat belongs to Romona or Max Smith. 
We'll pay you whatever you're into them. 
Bonino: The equipment belongs to me. Ross Blackham 
gave me authority. The equipment has been 
disposed of. 
48. On that same day, plantiff J. Fred Smith met with 
defendant Doug Shelley at the latter's place of 
business. The following conversation occurred: 
Smith: That's my Cat and my sheepsfoot. 
Shelley: I don't think so. 
Smith: I want them back. Will you haul them to 
Indianola for me? 
49. On November 6, 1991 Darwin C Fisher, acting on behalf 
of plantiffs J. Fred Smith and Romona Smith, wrote a 
letter and mailed it to defendant Doug Shelley. 
Partial text of the letter is as follows: 
...[Y]ou had no authority or right to take possession 
of the D-7 Caterpillar or Sheeps-Foot and...your 
continued possession of those items is wrongful. This 
letter is to serve you with written demand to make 
arrangements for delivery of those items to the 
rightful owners Romona Smith and Fred Smith by November 
8, 1991, before 12 o'clock p.m. 
50. Mr. Shelley received the letter and showed it to Mr. 
Bonino. 
R. at 366-68. 
Not only were Defendants aware from the outset that Plaintiffs 
owned the property, in fact, their own attorney knew of 
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Plaintiffs' ownership or possessory rights because he was counsel 
in the proceedings in Civil #9726 in which Plaintiff Max L. Smith 
was awarded possessory rights in the D-7 Caterpillar. 
6. Plantiff Max L. Smith was and is the defendent in a 
divorce action in this Court, case number 9726. A 
decree of divorce was entered in that case on September 
30, 1990. Paragraoh 25 of that decree reads as 
follows: 
The Defendant, Max L. Smith, is awarded the use 
and possession of the D7 Caterpillar (sic) subject 
to all liability thereon and holding the Plantiff 
harmless therefrom. The Plantiff is reserved the 
right to use said machinery upon twenty-four (24) 
hours notice to the Defendant. The Plantiff shall 
provide her own fuel. 
43. On September 30, 1991, plantiffs were in court in 
Sanpete County on another matter when they heard Mr. 
Berry say, "...There's already been heavy machinery 
that's been lost by Mr. Smith's inattentiveness, and he 
left a piece, a D7-Cat on a mountain and it's been 
taken off the mountain by the State of Utah; and I'm 
not sure what the status of that is, but I suspect it's 
gone by now because Mr. Smith had the machinery..." 
R. at 358, 366. 
Recognizing their position, Defendants even tried to claim 
authority from the County Attorney, however, the trial court 
found that there was no evidence supporting their claim. 
59. Defendants claimed authority to seize and hold the 
property from the Sanpete County Attorney. However, no 
evidence regarding such authority was presented. 
R. at 369. 
Defendants' claim to the property had no factual or legal 
basis. Their actions, coupled with the fact that their attorney 
also knew that their defense was without merit and that asserting 
it lacked good faith, also demonstrate that Defendants and their 
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attorney intended or had knowledge that their conduct would 
defraud Plaintiffs of their property. Nevertheless, Defendants, 
assisted by their attorney, asserted their defense evidencing 
their purposeful disregard for the truth and lack of an honest 
belief in the propriety of their assertion. The record 
supported, and the trial court correctly found, that Defendants' 
defense was without merit, and Defendants lacked good faith in 
asserting it. 
Ordinarily, if upon review of the record, this Court is able 
to find any legal basis for the trial court's award, we will 
affirm. See Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 
894-95 (Utah 1988) . 
Amica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 768 p.2d 950, 965 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1989) . 
The trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law 
sufficiently support its determination that Defendants' claim was 
without merit and lacked good faith. 
VIII. PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEYS FEES ON 
APPEAL. 
An appeal brought from an action which is properly 
determined to be in bad faith is necessarily frivolous under 
Utah R. App. P. 33. 
Utah Dep't of Social Servs. v. Adams, 806 p.2d 1193 (Utah Ct.App. 
1991) . 
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states: 
for purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, 
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, 
not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith 
argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. 
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Defendants7 claim was properly found by the trial court to be 
without merit and lacking in good faith. Defendants' appeal is 
not grounded in fact, is not supported by existing law, and does 
not attempt to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. 
Defendants' appeal is necessarily frivolous, and Plaintiffs are 
entitled to recover attorneys fees resulting from Defendants' 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Issues 7(b) and 7(e) on Defendants' docketing statement are 
waived for failure to brief the issues on appeal. 
Paragraphs 2 and 6 on page 2 of Appellants' Brief contain 
two issues which Defendants did not properly preserve for appeal 
which results in Defendants waiving them. 
Since Defendants do not contest the trial court's Findings 
of Fact, it is assumed that the record supports the findings of 
the trial court. Furthermore, since Defendants have failed to 
marshal the evidence to attack the trial court's Findings of 
Fact, the trial court's Findings of Fact are accepted as valid 
and to be supported by the weight of the evidence. 
The findings and conclusions support the trial court's 
determination that Defendants willfully and maliciously converted 
Plaintiffs' property. These findings and conclusions are well 
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supported by record evidence and justify punitive damages and 
attorneys fees as awarded by the trial court. 
Plaintiffs respectfully request this Court affirm the 
decision of the trial court. 
DATED THIS ^>fl^day of May, 1995. 
FISHER, SCRIBNER, MOODY & STIRLAND P.C, 
Darwin C. Fisher 
Donald E. McCandless 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
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the foregoing, postage prepaid, to the following this day of 
May, 1995: 
Andrew B. Berry, Jr. 
62 West Main Street 
Moroni, UT 84646-0600 
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78-27-54. Inherent risks of skiing — Trail boards listing 
inherent risks and limitations on liability. 
Ski area operators shall post trail boards at one or more prominent locations 
within each ski area which shall include a list of the inherent risks of skiing, 
and the limitations on liability of ski area operators, as defined in this act. 
Utah Law Review. — Utah's Inherent 
Risks of Skiing Act: Avalanche from Capitol 
Hill, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 355. 
History: L. 1979, ch. 166, § 4. 
Meaning of 'this act" — See note follow-
ing same catchline in notes to § 78-27-51. 
78-27-55. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 78-27-55 (L. 1979, ch. 
166, § 5), relating to notice requirements in 
case of injury arising from the inherent risks of 
ANALYSIS 
Breach of covenant of good faith by insurer. 
Discretion of court. 
Essential elements. 
Findings. 
Frivolous appeal. 
Hearing. 
State of mind. 
skiing and the statute of limitations on such 
action, was repealed by Laws 1980, ch. 43, § 1. 
"Without merit" and "good faith." 
Cited. 
Breach of covenant of good faith by in-
surer. 
Proof of a breach of the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing by an insurer does not 
show the bad faith necessary for an award un-
der this section. Canyon Country Store v. 
Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989). 
78-27-56. Attorney's fees — Award where action or de-
fense in bad faith — Exceptions. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines that the action or defense to the 
action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except 
under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a 
party under Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action 
before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees 
under the provisions of Subsection (1). 
History: L. 1981, ch. 13, § 1; 1988, ch. 92, following "civil actions" in Subsection (1); sub-
§ 1. stituted "shall" for "may" following "the court" 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- in Subsection (1); added "except under Subsec-
ment, effective April 25, 1988, inserted the tion (2)" at the end of Subsection (1) and added 
Subsection designation (1); deleted "where not Subsection (2). 
otherwise provided by statute or agreement" 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — The Utah Court of Appeals, 
1988 Utah L. Rev. 150. 
Rule 32. Interest on judgment. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, if a judgment for money in a civil case is 
affirmed, whatever interest is allowed by law shall be payable from the date 
the judgment was entered in the trial court. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and ment creditor appealing unsuccessfully on 
Error § 941. grounds of inadequacy, 15 A.L.R.3d 411. 
C.J.S. — 5 C .J.S. Appeal and Error § 995. Running of interest on judgment where both 
ATT* T^Ar i- i - A x J parties appeal, 11 A.L.R.4th 1099. 
A L.R. - Date from which interest on judg- Retrospective application and effect of state 
ment starts running, as affected by modifica-
 s t a t u t e o r ro,e a l l o w i n g i n t e r e s t o r c h a n g i n g 
tion of amount of judgment on appeal, 4
 r a t e o f i n t e r e s t on judgments or verdicts, 41 
A.L.R.3d 1221. A.L.R.4th 694. 
Right to interest, pending appeal, of judg- Key Numbers. — Interest *» 39(2). 
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery 
of attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of 
right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal 
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just 
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, 
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order 
that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, 
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or 
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for 
the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to 
harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will 
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
(c) Procedures. 
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its 
own motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of 
the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of 
the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other 
paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court 
shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show 
cause why such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause 
shall set forth the allegations which form the basis of the damages and 
permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for 
good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of 
oral argument. 
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the 
court shall grant a hearing. 
